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Abstract		
Within	aerospace	and	defence	sectors,	organisations	are	adding	value	to	their	core	corporate	
offerings	through	services.	These	services	tend	to	emphasize	the	potential	to	maintain	future	
revenue	streams	and	improved	profitability	and	hence	require		the	establishment	of	cost	effective	
strategies	that	can	manage	uncertainties	within	value	led	services	e.g.	maintenance	activities.	In	
large	organizations,	decision	making	is	often	supported	by	information	processing	and	decision	
aiding	systems;	it	is	not	always	apparent	whose	decision	affects	the	outcome	the	most.	Often,	
accountability	moves	away	from	the	designated	organization	personnel	in	unforeseen	ways,	and	
depending	on	the	decisions	of	individual	decision	makers,	the	structure	of	the	organization,	or	
unregulated	operating	procedures	may	change.	This	can	have	far	more	effect	on	the	overall	system	
reliability	–	leading	to	inadequate	troubleshooting,	repeated	down-time,	reduced	availability	and	
increased	burden	on	Through-life	Engineering	Services.	
	
This	paper	focuses	on	outlining	current	industrial	attitudes	regarding	the	No	Fault	Found	(NFF)	
phenomena	and	identifies	the	drivers	that	influence	the	NFF	decision	making	process.	It	articulates	
the	contents	of	tacit	knowledge	and	addresses	a	knowledge	gap	by	developing	NFF	management	
policies.	The	paper	further	classifies	the	NFF	phenomenon	into	five	key	processes	that	must	be	
controlled	by	using	the	developed	policies.	In	addition	to	the	theoretical	developments,	a	Petri	net	
model	is	also	outlined	and	discussed	based	on	the	captured	information	regarding	NFF	decision	
making	in	organisations.	Since	NFF	decision	making	is	influenced	by	several	factors,	Petri	nets	is	
sought	as	a	powerful	tool	to	realise	a	meta-model	capability	to	understand	the	complexity	of	
situations.	Its	potential	managerial	implications	can	help	describe	decision	problems	under	
conditions	of	uncertainty.	Finally,	the	conclusions	indicate	that	engineering	processes,	which	allow	
decision	making	at	various	maintenance	echelons,	can	often	obfuscate	problems	that	then	require	a	
systems	approach	to	illustrate	the	impact	of	the	issue.		
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1	Introduction	
The	 business	model	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 high-value	 capital	 assets,	 such	 as	 aero	
engines,	trains	and	medical	scanners,	is	undergoing	a	fundamental	shift	(Baines	et	al	2007,	Baines	et	
al	2009).	There	is	now	a	growing	value	in	maintaining	the	life	of	a	manufactured	product	throughout	
its	lifecycle,	and	a	number	of	services	have	grown	to	meet	this	need.	A	field	that	stems	out	from	the	
need	 to	guarantee	performance	and	 function	of	high	 value	assets	over	 their	operational	 life	 cycle	
has	been	called	Through-life	Engineering	Services	(TES).	According	to	Roy	et	al	(2013),	TES	accounts	
for	over	55	%	of	revenue	for	high-value	manufacturing	companies	within	the	aerospace	and	defence	
sectors.	For	example,	maintenance	is	a	service	often	borne	by	the	end	user;	this	is	now	evolving	into	
a	 service-based	 model	 in	 which	 a	 maintenance	 provider	 takes	 over	 the	 responsibility	 for	 the	
operability	and	maintenance	of	the	asset	(Zhang	Z,	and	Chu	X	2010).	
	
This	is	seen	within	a	number	of	aerospace	companies	where	the	time-limited	contract	for	operating	
a	 particular	 service	 is	 given	 to	 a	 company	who	 then	 lease	 the	 asset	 (engine)	 from	 its	 owner	 and	
contract	with	a	maintenance	company	under	a	service	level	agreement	to	ensure	availability	of	the	
asset;	often	the	provider	of	the	asset.	Such	a	business	model	provides	motivation	for	improving	the	
maintenance	process	in	order	to	reduce	through-life	costs	and	maximize	profits	on	those	contracts.	
System	 maintenance,	 in	 the	 context	 to	 through-life	 engineering,	 has	 become	 essential	 to	 gain	 a	
competitive	edge	within	the	service	delivery	market	(Roy	R	et	al,	2013).	Since	all	systems	(or	assets)	
are	 unique,	 there	will	 inevitably	 be	 uncertainty	 that	will	 influence	 their	 operation	 and	 the	 efforts	
required	to	maintain	system	availability.		
However,	to	manage	uncertainty,	organisations	need	to	increase	interactions	amongst	themselves;	
to	carry	out	distributed	decisions	with	existing	information	and	decision	technologies.	Examples	of	
the	results	of	such	interaction	are:	
• The	large	amounts	of	data	collected	and	processed	
• The	proliferation	of	displays	for	presenting	information	in	a	form	suitable	for	supporting	
decision	making	at	different	echelons	of	an	organizational	(or	functional)	hierarchy	
• The	massive	exchange	of	data	and	information	among	the	nodes	of	a	distributed	
organization.		
However,	these	developments	of	effective	systems	and	informatics	are	not	only	dependant	on	the	
available	technology	(such	as	the	sensors,	databases,	communications	systems	and	human-
computer	interfaces)	but	also	on	the	structure	of	the	decision	making	organizations	and	the	
cognitive	processes	embedded	in	the	organisation	ethos.		
	
Depending	on	the	granularity	in	system	requirements,	humans	play	a	vital	role	in	organisational	
processes.	In	this	context,	the	human	continues	to	occupy	a	central	role	in	decision	making.	The	
structure	of	the	organization	might	affect	the	human	decision	maker's	ability	to	work	effectively	
under	time	pressure	in	a	stressful	environment	(such	as	the	one	experienced	by	air	traffic	
controllers,	foreign	exchange	traders,	military	commanders	in	battle,	or	the	operators	of	the	control	
centre	of	a	power	plant	during	an	emergency).	However,	an	organization	at	times	may	exhibit	
dynamic	phenomena	that	were	not	anticipated	during	the	construction	of	the	organizational	
structure.		
	
There	is	much	anecdotal	evidence	from	engineering	managers	that	their	organizations	can	act	in	an	
unpredictable	manner;	away	from	decision	makers	who	were	assigned	specific	responsibilities	to	
manage	lower	echelons.	Changes	in	organization	structure,	such	as	access	to	decision	support	
systems,	can	change	the	sensitivity	of	the	performance	measures	to	the	actions	of	different	decision	
makers.	Furthermore,	the	choice	of	strategies	on	the	part	of	these	decision	makers	affects	which	
one	has	most	impact	on	performance.	This	shift	in	responsibility	can	be	viewed	from	both	positive	
and	negative	perspectives.	In	the	former,	it	is	desirable	for	control	to	mitigate	the	chances	of	a	
failure.	Kahne	(1983)	has	highlighted	this	connotation	while	discussing	a	command,	control,	and	
communication	system.	According	to	the	author,	in	order	to	maintain	system	performance,	
responsibilities	must	be	able	to	move	(within	the	organisation	hierarchy)	through	a	large	scale	
system.	This	is	to	adapt	to	any	structural	changes	in	the	system.	However,	from	a	negative	
perspective,	shifting	responsibilities	can	lead	to	unforeseen	(or	undesirable)	situations.	For	example,	
moving	away	from	accountability	executives	(who	should	hold	the	positions	of	responsibility	in	
favour	of	subordinates),	can	cause	the	performance	of	an	organization	to	deteriorate	if,	what	were	
seen	to	be	efficient	(and	effective)	means	of	processing	information,	are	modified.	Even	if	the	
structure	is	designed	so	that	the	overall	task	is	performed	without	overloading	employees,	it	can	
result	in	a	wide	range	of	performance	depending	on	the	strategies	chosen	by	the	decision	makers.	
Therefore,	it	is	important	to	ensure	that	strategies	that	are	mutually	acceptable	are	most	regulated	
and	standardised	within	the	industry.		
	
One	problem	that	causes	a	lot	of	confusion	during	aircraft	maintenance	is	the	No	Fault	Found	(NFF)	
phenomenon.	NFF	has	been	described	as	“a	reported	fault	for	which	the	root	cause	cannot	be	
found”	(Khan	et	al,	2015).	This	can	be	an	output	from	a	failed	diagnostic	process,	which	may	
comprise	of	a	sequence	of	interlinking	events	–	perhaps	at	different	maintenance	levels.	NFF	is	a	
disruptive	mechanism	for	TES.	From	a	financial	point	of	view,	this	causes	a	burden	to	almost	
everybody	associated	with	the	through	life	support	service	i.e.	from	the	operators	and	customers,	to	
the	manufacturers	and	their	suppliers.	The	direct	investment	of	resources	and	time	to	investigate	
NFF	events	on	the	business	is	not	easily	quantifiable	(Erkoyuncu	et	al,	2016).	These	can	be	costs	such	
as	those	incurred	within	the	supply	chain,	maintenance	performance,	as	well	as	indirect	effects	such	
as	customer	perception	and	nugatory	maintenance	efforts.	One	notable	gap	identified	in	current	
NFF	literature	is	regarding	the	characteristics	that	limit	the	NFF	decision	making	process	(Khan	et	al,	
2014a).		Based	on	this,	this	research	paper	aims	to	provide	more	insights	to	how	NFF	related	
decisions	actually	move	within	organisations	and	therefore	addressing	the	question:	“what	are	the	
characteristics	that	can	enhance	or	limit	the	NFF	decision	making	process?”	
	
The	paper	makes	use	of	information	provided	by	three	major	participating	aerospace	organisations;	
that	have	chosen	to	remain	anonymous	in	the	publication	–	they	included	a	systems	integrator,	a	
components	manufacturer	and	a	systems	operator.	The	research	work	explored	their	management	
strategies	on	dealing	with	NFF	events	during	maintenance	activities.	The	aim	was	to	understand	how	
their	decision	making	processes	impact	their	business	environment	and	to	verify	what	characteristics	
enhance	(or	constrain)	the	organisations	from	making	those	decisions.	Such	analysis	can	allow	the	
identification	of	accountability	and	dominant	decision	makers	within	their	management	hierarchy	.		
Some	recommendations	are	made	for	improvements	by	directing	work	towards	increasing	the	
efficiency	of	information	flow	in	large	scale	organizations.	However,	this	work	can	ultimately	help	in	
introducing	policies	within	organisations	in	order	to	avoid	any	undesirable	non-accountability	
situations.	A	method	for	modelling	the	decision	making	processes	and	understanding	their	impact	
across	organizations	is	also	outlined.		
The	novelties	in	the	paper	can	be	summarised	as:	
• Evidence	of	industrial	attitudes	regarding	the	NFF	phenomena		
• Identification	of	the	drivers	that	influence	the	NFF	decision	making	process	
• Addressing	a	knowledge	gap	by	developing	management	policies		
• An	NFF	process	map	across	three	organisations	–	as	a	Petri	net	model	
	
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	structured	as	follows:	Section	2	discusses	the	related	literature	associated	
with	the	problem.	The	authors	note	the	interactions	that	take	place	within	organisations	and	how	
NFF	manifests	itself	within	them.	The	following	critique	reveals	the	industrial	attitude	towards	the	
problem	and	what	influences	the	NFF	decision	making	process.	Section	4	presents	the	research	
methodology	on	how	this	research	was	carried	out.	This	is	followed	by	the	interview	responses	in	
Section	5,	which	were	taken	during	the	course	of	this	research.	This	section	also	highlights	the	
importance	of	establishing	policies	for	managing	NFF	problems	and	introduces	five	key	processes	
that	must	be	controlled	by	these	policies	to	mitigate	NFF.	Section	6	builds	upon	the	knowledge	
acquired	from	the	literature	and	interviews	to	map	the	NFF	decision	making	process	(as	a	Petri	net	
model)	across	three	organisations.	Finally,	the	conclusions	and	future	work	is	enumerated.	
	
2	Background	Literature	
2.1	Why	is	NFF	an	issue?	
The	existence	of	the	NFF	issue	has	significant	negative	impact	upon	critical	system	stakeholder	
requirements,	which	at	the	top	level,	includes	systems	safety,	dependability	and	life-cycle	costs	
(Khan	et	al,	2014a).	To	deliver	stakeholder	requirements	efficiently,	it	is	essential	to	prevent,	or	at		
least,	reduce	the	level	of	impact	that	NFF	can	have	on	a	business	operation.	From	a	technical	
standpoint,	a	‘No	Fault	Found’	tagged	component	is	the	result	of	an	unsuccessful	(or	inefficient)	
troubleshooting	regime	of	an	unscheduled	maintenance	activity.		
	
	
Figure	1:	The	Stakeholders	and	their	Interaction	at	Component	level	(Khan	et	al	2015)	
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In	order	to	understand	the	problem,	consider	Figure	1	which	illustrates	the	complexities	with	
stakeholders	and	processes	involved	during	the	maintenance	process	of	a	component’s	life	cycle.		
These	include	the	manufacturer1,	the	operator	and	the	supplier.	The	interactions	that	take	place	
between	the	stakeholders	are	explained	in	Table	1:		
	
Table	1:	Organisational	interactions	
	
Between	
System	Design	
and	Operation	
The	Manufacturer	is	the	design	authority	and	provides	maintenance	support.	
Maintenance	Documentation,	Service	Bulletins	(SB)	and	Service	Instruction	
Letters	(SIL)	all	come	from	the	Manufacturer.	
	
The	Manufacturer	often	receives	Maintenance	Support	Requests	from	the	
Operator	and	can	also	be	asked	for	Maintenance	Data	from	the	Operator.	
	
The	Aircraft	is	the	subject	of	consideration,	which	is,	amongst	others,	usually	
equipped	with	some	form	of	On-Board	Maintenance	System	(OMS),	Logbook	and	
technical	documentation,	etc.		
	
The	Operator	will	receive	the	Maintenance	Records	from	the	aircraft’s	
OMS/Logbook.	In	response,	the	Maintenance	Organisation	(or	the	operator’s	
Engineering	Department)	will	carry	out	Maintenance	and	deliver	this	information	
in	some	suitable	format	to	the	OMS	and	the	Logbook	(on	board	the	aircraft).	This	
department	will	receive	Performance	Data	from	the	aircraft	and	will	then	provide	
the	required	Engineering	Support.	
To	/	From	
Maintenance	
Line	Maintenance	will	receive	Maintenance	Status	information	from	the	Aircraft	
via	the	Logbook	and	will	perform	the	required	Maintenance	Actions.	They	will	
make	corresponding	Logbook	Entries,	to	document	the	Return-to-Service	(RTS)	
status.	
	
Shop	Maintenance	will	receive	Unserviceable	components	from	Line	Maintenance	
for	testing,	troubleshooting,	calibration,	repair,	etc.	It	will	provide	Serviceable	
components	for	replacement.	
	
Shop	Maintenance	will	deliver	Unserviceable	SRUs	to	the	Supplier	or	Original	
Equipment	Manufacturer	(OEM)	of	that	equipment	for	testing,	troubleshooting,	
calibration,	repair,	etc.	It	can	receive	Serviceable	SRUs	from	the	Supplier/OEM	in	
return.	
To	/	From	
Supplier/OEM	
The	Supplier/OEM	will	support	the	Shop	Maintenance	by	replacing	Unserviceable	
units	with	Serviceable	ones.	Unserviceable	units	may	undergo	bench	testing,	
troubleshooting,	calibration,	repair,	etc.	They	can	even	reach	their	End-of-Life	and	
Beyond-Economical-Repair	status.	
	
The	Supplier/OEM	will	deliver	Systems/Components	to	the	aircraft	Manufacturer	
for	initial	production,	and	can	also	sometimes	receive	unserviceable/rogue	
Systems/Components	back	
	
Within	the	interactions	highlighted	in	Table	1,	a	number	of	issues	can	arise:	
																																								 																				
1	This	can	also	be	the	system	integrator	
• The	Original	Equipment	Manufacturer	(OEM)	may	not	understand	the	circumstances	of	a	
failure	(Khan	et	al,	2014b).	NFF	is	inherently	a	by-product	of	a	lack	of	detail	given	by	the	
environment	in	which	the	failure	occurred,	and	the	testing	inability	to	replicate	that	
environment	and	fault.	In	other	words,	a	NFF	is	sentenced	by	the	supplier,	or	repair	station,	
due	to	a	lack	of	incoming	information	about	the	part	and/or	the	bench	test	procedures	are	
too	restrictive.	It	means	that	a	test	bench	where	actual	environmental	condition	is	
reproduced	may	be	necessary	in	finding	the	cause	of	NFF.	
• Reliance	on	the	Acceptance	Test	Procedure	to	identify	faults	(Knotts,	1999).	During	the	
troubleshooting	procedure,	the	manufacturer	will	have	issued	a	set	of	procedures	(for	
particular	fault	codes/failure	modes)	that	were	developed	during	the	system	design	phase.	
However,	when	these	fail	to	identify	the	problem,	other	resources	must	be	brought	to	bear	
during	system	operation	–	help	escalation	channels,	technician	training,	supporting	
documentation,	etc.		Due	to	this,	it	is	often	difficult	to	define	a	fixed	set	of	test	procedures	
that	can	verify	the	full	functionality	of	a	component.	As	a	consequence,	it	will	lead	to	a	log	
report	that	contains	spurious	fault	detection,	e.g.	operator/pilot	reports	on	faults	may	not	
correspond	to	the	test	logs,	resulting	in	overlooked	maintenance	issues.	
• An	over-sensitive	BIT2	system	intolerant	of	intermittency	(Khan	et	al,	2014b).	The	design	of	a	
BIT	system	is	a	non-trivial	task	and	relies	deeply	on	the	knowledge	of	all	the	system	
interactions.	As	electronic	equipment	evolves	into	ever	more	complex	systems,	BIT	is	
increasingly	depended	upon	to	provide	in-situ	fault	detection	and	isolation	capabilities.	
Failures	reported	by	over-sensitive	BIT	tests	can	be	costly,	and	are	likely	to	result	in	
component	replacement,	recertification,	or	inevitable	loss	of	availability	of	the	equipment.	
The	nature	of	BITs	will	be,	in	some	way,	dependent	upon	a	set	of	pre-defined	statistical	
limits	for	the	various	parameters	which	are	being	monitored.	It	is	important	to	recognize	
that	BITs	will	report	failures	when	either	they	have	exceeded	a	specified	threshold,	or	when	
the	intermittency	of	the	BIT	measurements	throws	the	test	results	outside	of	the	testing	
limits.	The	former	of	these	is	a	direct	result	of	component	failure,	for	example	a	burnt	out	
resistor.	The	latter	occurs	when	a	measured	parameter,	which	has	intermittent	errors,	are	
measured	by	an	instrument	having	its	own	noise.		
	
• Intermittent	faults	not	detected	by	test	equipment	(Qi	et	al,	2008).	Intermittency	is	arguably	
the	most	problematic	of	the	NFF	events	due	to	their	elusive	nature,	making	detection	by	
																																								 																				
2	Built	in	tests	(BIT)	is	a	mechanism	that	permits	a	system	to	test	itself.	Engineers	design	them	to	meet	specific	
requirements,	such	as	high	reliability,	lower	repair	cycle	times,	etc	
standard	test	equipment	difficult.	The	faulty	state	will	often	lay	dormant	until	a	component	
is	back	in	operational	use,	where	it	eventually	causes	further	unit	removals	unless	a	genuine	
cause	is	found.	It	should	be	emphasized	that	these	failures	are	not	always	present	during	
testing,	which	make	them	troublesome	to	isolate.	This	situation	can	result	in	repeated	
removals	of	the	same	equipment	for	the	same	symptom,	with	each	rejection	resulting	in	the	
equipment	being	tagged	as	NFF.	At	this	stage,	there	is	a	high	probability	that	there	will	be	
loss	of	system	functionality,	integrity	and	perhaps,	even	an	unacceptable	compromise	in	
safety	requirements.	
	
• The	nature	of	repairs	does	not	reflect	the	original	failure	(Khan	et	al	2015).	This	highlights	
that	a	fault	was	isolated,	but	it	does	not	related	to	the	root	cause	or	fault	symptom.		The	
original	defect	is	likely	to	re-appear,	and	as	a	result	of	unsuccessful	troubleshooting	
attempts	it	will	directly	result	in	unscheduled	maintenance	jobs.		
	
• Multiple	rejections	for	apparently	the	same	failure	(Khan	et	al	2014a).	The	ability	to	
recognize	a	failure	is	of	paramount	importance	in	mitigating	the	effects	of	NFF	events.	The	
key	to	distinguishing		failures	is	to	implement	the	necessary	procedures	to	track	the	
underlying	conditions	in	which	they	occur;	like	the	environment,	the	platform	on	which	the	
components	was	installed,	number	of	operating	hours/cycles,	number	of	hours	since	its	last	
overhaul	and	a	genuine	reason	for	the	generated	removal	codes.	In	addition	to	this,	the	
history	of	the	operating	platform	(be	that	a	wind	turbine,	aircraft	or	train)	should	be	
recorded	to	determine	the	exact	effects	the	failure	has	on	the	overall	system.		
This	list	is	non-exhaustive,	but	it	does	help	recognise	that	the	NFF	phenomenon	creates	time	
consuming	problems	and	costly	bottlenecks	within	the	maintenance	program	that	must	be	
controlled	by	sound	decision	making.	From	a	management	point-of-view,	three	critical	NFF	related	
questions	arise:	
• What	is	the	business	impact	of	the	NFF	failure	(e.g.	on	system	availability)?		
• Should	NFF	reports	be	investigated	straight	away	(e.g.	if	it	does	not	breach	any	contract	
agreements)?		
• Should	NFF	event	investigations	be	avoided	in	the	future	(e.g.	NFF	events	potentially	
generate	business	for	the	system	provider)?	
	
So	even	though	quick	and	accurate	identification	of	the	source	of	the	problem	might	be	critical	(for	
recovery	and	lower	costs)	for	the	operator,	its	business	implications	will	be	different	for	the	OEMs	
and	equipment	suppliers.	Therefore,	there	seems	to	be	mutual	benefits	of	solving	such	issues,	and	
there	is	encouragement	to	share	information	in	between	operators,	OEMs	and	suppliers.	However,	
organisational	devotion	to	NFF	investigations	is	critical	(Khan,	2015).	To	obtain	full	involvement,	
there	is	a	need	for	champions	who	can	make	sound	judgements	and	recognise	the	impact	of	their	
decisions.	It	has	been	noted	that	for	corrective	maintenance	approximately	75.5%	of	NFF	costs	affect	
the	customer,	14.7%	affect	the	supplier	chain	whereas	9.8%	is	taken	by	OEMs	–	who	also	worry	
about	their	customer	satisfaction	and	brand	image	being	damaged	(Erkoyuncu	et	al,	2016).	This	is	
the	most	important	asset	for	premium	service	providers.	
	
During	the	course	of	numerous	discussions	with	maintenance	personnel,	and	outcomes	from	3	NFF	
symposiums	2012-153,	it	was	revealed	that	the	OEM	is	reluctant	to	be	held	accountable	for	the	
mismanagement	of	NFF	issues.	However,	there	seems	to	be	a	strong	theme	to	manage	the	product	
knowledge,	especially	regarding	integration	of	system	equipment.	Modern	troubleshooting	requires	
intensive	knowledge	for	investigations;	however	the	current	infrastructure	to	support	knowledge	
management	and	organisational	policies	appear	ineffective	(as	the	tasks	are	becoming	more	
demanding).	In	the	midst	of	the	problem	are	the	maintenance	managers	who	will	manage	their	
resources	according	to	the	company	ethos.	Therefore	accountability	becomes	an	indispensable	part	
in	any	fundamental	solutions	for	controlling	NFF.		
	
3.	Critique	on	literature	
In	the	organizational	context,	it	is	important	to	analyse	the	various	facets	of	a	system	function	and	in	
what	way	its	elements	work	together	to	reveal	how	NFF	manifests	itself	during	maintenance	
activities.	For	example,	at	the	top-most	level,	a	legislative	body	would	force	the	law	and	
requirements	that	will	determine	the	local	activities	for	inspection	and	repair,	which	personnel	will	
have	to	follow.	At	this	point,	organizations	are	responsible	for	the	quality	control4	and	quality	
assurance5	of	the	maintenance	system	and	any	troubleshooting	process.	Failure	to	carry	out	these	
two	activities	can	cause	maintenance	errors	and	inefficiencies	–	resulting	in	financial	issues.			
	
Typically,	an	organisation’s	maintenance	plan	would	typically	support	actions	at	three	levels:		
																																								 																				
3	For	a	list	of	outcomes	from	the	NFF	Symposium,	see	Khan	(2015)	
4	Carrying	out	inspections	and	auditing	actions	from	regulatory	bodies,	e.g.	the	Civil	Aviation	Authority		
5	The	function	includes	checking	engineering	change	orders,	auditing	and	investigating	maintenance	activities	
and	components	for	errors,	and	examining	records.	
1. Strategic	level:	Priorities	and	critical	targets	are	established	in	accordance	with	business	
goals.	The	strategic	level	is	represented	by	senior	management.	
2. Tactical	level:	Resource	requirements	to	achieve	the	maintenance	plan	are	determined	
which	include	requirements,	planning	and	scheduling.	The	tactical	level	is	represented	by	
mid-level	management.	
3. Operational	level:	Maintenance	tasks	performed	in	the	scheduled	time.	The	operational	
level	is	represented	by	the	maintenance	staff.	
	
Generally,	the	staff	at	the	operational	level,	which	encompasses	the	‘work	on	the	ground’,	have	a	
good	understanding	of	the	NFF	phenomena;	testing	and	repair	work	takes	place	here	and	the	
operational	level	personnel	are	the	ones	who	will	identify	a	NFF.	This	is	due	to	the	nature	of	the	
problem	as	it	appears	primarily	during	system	operation	and	hence	the	on-field	personnel	are	the	
first	ones	to	experience	its	consequences.		It	is	at	this	stage	that	NFF	has	the	potential	to	
economically	affect	the	system	operation	due	to	incorrect	fault	diagnoses,	wastage	of	resources	and	
unproductive	time	utilization	that	adds	to	maintenance	costs,	downtime	and	unavailability	of	the	
system.	It	can	further	damage	the	reputation	and	relationships	within	the	supply	chain,	which	is	
where	the	tactical	level	will	get	involved	as	they	experience	the	shortage	of	spares,	and	the	time	
their	maintainers	spend	looking	for	faults	that	cannot	being	isolated.	Due	to	time	pressures,	the	
tactical	level	will	need	to	make	decisions	as	to	whether	to	allow	their	staff	to	keep	searching	for	the	
symptom-to-cause	relationship	of	the	reported	fault	in	order	to	remove	the	NFF	label;	alternatively	
they	must	accept	the	NFF	and	send	the	equipment	back	through	the	certification	loop,	or	order	
further	investigations	by	sending	the	equipment	to	a	deeper	level	of	maintenance.	At	the	strategic	
level,	NFF	events	do	not	inflict	an	immediate	financial	impact,	due	to	a	lack	of	benchmarks,	and	
hence	they	struggle	to	understand	the	long	term	consequences	that	NFF	events	inflict	on	
engineering	practices.		However,	decisions	made	at	the	organisation’s	strategic	level	directly	
influence	the	tactical	and	operational	performances.		It	is	suggested	therefore	that	if	the	cost	of	NFF	
at	the	strategic	level	were	clear,	it	would	enable	NFF	resolution	to	become	an	integrated	part	of	the	
continuous	improvement	strategy	of	the	organisation.	This	has	been	the	subject	of	many	
discussions,	and	helps	clarifies	why	the	NFF	phenomenon	has	not	been	able	to	attract	much	
attention	for	resolution,	despite	being	a	known	issue	for	many	decades	(Khan,	2015).	
	
Roberts	et	al	(1994)	have	argued	that	there	are	three	characteristics	that	influences	decision	making	
within	organisations;	these	include	high	accountability,	low	familiarity	(or	routine	with	the	situation)	
and	high	political	stake.	Contrary	to	this,	Hart	et	al.	(1993)	established	that	high	time	pressure	was	a	
key	characteristic	for	situations	where	the	decisions	making	process	takes	place	at	the	bottom	of	the	
management	hierarchy.	The	propositions	by	Roberts	et	al.	(1994)	and	Hart	et	al.	(1993)	are	related	
to	how	key	decisions	actually	move	in	industrial	organisations	under	operational	pressure	–	it	is	a	
notable	gap	in	current	NFF	knowledge	regarding	characteristics	that	limit	its	decision	making	
process.		Making	use	of	an	NFF	policy	can	help	bridge	this	gap	and	regulate	the	problem.	
	
So	what	influences	individuals	when	making	decisions	related	to	NFF	events	and	what	should	its	
policy	entail?		Let’s	explore	this	question	in	the	context	of	accountability,	the	culture	of	the	
organisation;	the	experience	of	individuals	in	making	NFF	related	decisions,	the	operational	
environment	and	pressure:	
	
1. Accountability:	According	to	Roberts	et	al.	(1994),	high	accountability	leads	to	people	
making	more	accurate	decisions,	whereas	on	the	other	hand	according	to	the	second	
proposition	“intense	accountability	leads	to	feelings	of	high	responsibility	which	are	relieved	
by	ranching6	decisions	up	in	the	organization”.	This	implies	that	perceived	high	
accountability	is	a	characteristic	that	enhances	the	decision	making	upwards	within	the	
management	hierarchy	of	an	organisation.	Therefore,	NFF	investigations	should	not	just	be	a	
peripheral	activity	rather	it	must	be	reflected	within	its	senior	management	in	order	to	
establish	mutual	perceptions	with	regards	to	the	consequence	of	NFF	on	the	maintenance	
budget.	Managers	participate	in	(or	facilitate)	the	decision-making	process	for	the	allocation	
of	resources,	the	development	and	implementation	of	strategic	plans,	the	establishment	of	
intervention	and	control	strategies.	Due	to	their	role,	managers	implement	strategies	and	
practices	that	aim	to	improve	standards	and	other	related	tasks.	It	should	be	clear	by	now	
that	the	influence	of	NFF,	on	maintenance	plans	and	system	availability,	is	far	more	evident	
to	maintenance	managers.	This	is	supported	by	several	cogent	arguments	which	indicate	the	
complexities	within	commercial	contracts,	organisational	bureaucracies	and	the	lack	of	
adequate	metrics	for	costing	the	impact	of	NFF	units	within	the	supply	chain.	Therefore,	a	
policy	must	recognise	the	role	of	senior	management	as	a	vital	function	in	the	need	to	
improve	supporting	actions	and	budgeting	for	NFF	reduction.	
	
2. The	culture	of	the	organisation:	An	organisation’s	culture	evidently	has	similarity	with	
human	factors	but	tends	to	describe	the	corrective	aspect	rather	than	the	individual.	They	
have	been	recognised	to	be	exceedingly	bureaucratic	and	difficult	in	their	response	to	
																																								 																				
6	To	cause	something	to	rise	(or	fall)	as	a	step	in	what	is	perceived	as	an	irreversible	process	
changes;	hence	not	recognizing	NFF	as	a	problem	(Khan	et	al,	2015).	However,	many	
practitioners	agree	that	one	of	the	most	significant	contributory	factors	of	NFF	events	are	
attributed	to	the	behaviour,	skill	sets	and	communication	between	an	organization's	
technicians,	engineers	and	management	personnel.		
	
“The	problem	here	lies	more	at	the	human	level	as	there	are	so	many	human	failings	related	
to	the	variety	of	ways	that	faults	are	reported,	the	ways	maintenance	manuals	that	are	
written	and	presented,	and	the	ways	troubleshooting	tests	are	designed.	Adding	the	mix	of	
training,	expertise	and	experience	that	each	engineer	has	in	troubleshooting	will	affect	how	
a	company	approaches	NFF	events.	However,	there	are	often	insufficient	resources	to	repair	
items	on	time,	as	well	as	not	enough	information,	training	and	tools.”	(Khan,	2014a).		
	
Reasons	that	are	often	recognized	are	similar	to	those	acknowledged	at	the	individual	levels	
–	that	affect	individual	behaviour:		
1. Lack	of	communication		
2. Not	following	the	correct	process		
3. Workforce	behaviour		
4. Lack	of	training		
5. Operational	pressure		
	
3. The	experience	of	individuals	in	making	NFF	related	decisions:	Troubleshooting	processes	
are	affected	not	only	by	training	and	tools,	but	are	also	heavily	dependent	upon	experience.	
This	is	important	as	increased	levels	of	system	complexity	are	a	major	cause	of	NFF	events	
and	the	experience	of	maintenance	personnel	is	critical	to	provide	system	familiarity.	When	
the	system	is	complex,	unless	the	maintainer	is	knowledgeable	or	experienced,	they	will	
simply	send	the	whole	unit	for	repair	rather	than	carry	out	further	troubleshooting	to	
identify	the	component	at	fault.	In	operational	conditions,	there	can	often	be	a	lack	of	
expert	knowledge	for	fault	diagnosis	due	to	their	unavailability	–	perhaps	due	to	different	
shifts,	sickness,	or	a	holiday.	This.	Khan	et	al	(2014a)	summarised	the	current	challenges	of	
on-site	experience:	
1. To	store	this	experience-based	knowledge,	and	deliver	it	at	the	time	and	place	that	
the	same	problem	symptoms	occur,	so	that	it	can	be	re-used	to	help	solve	the	
problem	on	the	first	attempt.		
2. To	deliver	that	knowledge	in	a	form	that	is	useful	to	experts	and	less-experienced	
technicians	alike.	
3. To	share	this	knowledge	so	that	everyone	benefits	from	the	experience	of	others.	
4. To	integrate	the	knowledge	access	with	the	existing	troubleshooting	tools	so	that	it	
becomes	part	of	the	usual	troubleshooting	workflow.	
	
4. Operational	environment:	Environment	interactions	can	be	broad	based	in	the	context	of:	
1. Physical	environment	–	includes	the	physical	environment	as	the	workplace,	such	as	
the	maintenance	hangar	or	workshop	
2. Working	conditions	–	includes	working	patterns,	management	structures,	training	
and	company	organizational	structure.	
	
Environment	related	implications,	cannot	be	ignored	as	they	potentially	have	the	most	
significant	impact	on	the	behavior	of	maintenance	staff	and	influence	their	ability	to	
undertake	effective	fault	diagnosis.		Aviation	maintenance	is	generally	undertaken	in	a	fast-
moving	environment	where	engineers	are	regularly	challenged	by	time	pressures,	limited	
supervision	and	difficult	working	conditions,	which	can	result	in	human	error.	Lack	of	time	
and	associated	pressure	is	a	major	issue	within	aviation	maintenance	due	to	the	penalties	
such	as	financial	and	reputational,	if	the	aircraft	is	not	available	for	its	role	of	carrying	fare-
paying	passengers,	which	is	the	primary	source	of	income	for	operators.		
	
5. Decisions	about	NFF	events	can	be	influenced	by	time	pressure	and	high	uncertainty.	Kruke	
and	Olsen	(2012)	noted	that	the	more	complex	a	problem,	the	higher	in	the	organisational	
hierarchy	decisions	tends	to	be	made	about	them.		However,	the	fact	is	that	to	solve	and	
make	decisions	about	a	problem,	it	is	essential	to	understand	it	–	this	is	why	many	engineers	
agree	that	their	management	hierarchy	does	not	recognize	the	gravity	of	the	NFF	
phenomena,	as	no	metrics	exist	which	can	estimate	and	present	its	impact	to	them.	
	
4	Research	Methodology		
This	study,	on	the	NFF	decision	making	process,	has	actively	been	involved	with	maintenance	
engineers	from	defence	and	civil	aviation	backgrounds.	
	
Figure	2	illustrates	the	adopted	research	methodology.	A	key	component	within	the	research	was	
the	application	of	a	robust	data	collection	phase	that	can	effectively	capture	data	from	the	targeted	
maintenance	chain.	The	authors	of	this	paper	have	placed	emphasis	primarily	on	gathering	
information	from	maintenance	engineers	and	related	managers;	but	other	personnel	in	technical	
support	services	were	also	included.	The	scope	of	participants	involved	covers	a	wide	range	of	
systems,	i.e.	legacy/modern	platforms,	young/experienced	maintainers	and	operators/	
supplier/OEM.	This	is	an	important	factor	as	several	personnel	adopt	different	practices	on	systems	
depending	on	their	systems,	experiences	and	business	requirements.	The	choice	of	the	research	
approach	is	also	supported	by	Maylor	&	Blackmon	(2005)	who	advocate	that	investigating	case	
studies	are	a	useful	way	to	study	a	phenomenon	and	its	constituents	in	a	real	life	setting.			
	
	
Figure	2:	Adopted	research	methodology	
	
Before	continuing	any	further,	the	authors	would	like	to	outline	the	assumptions	associated	with	the	
research:	
• The	research	work	is	carried	out	by	competent	personnel	
• All	participating	maintenance	personnel	provided	their	understandings	based	on	their	
individual	experiences	and	were	not	influenced	by	any	pressure	
• All	participants	are	familiar	with	the	NFF	phenomenon	and	the	challenges	it	presents	
	
Also,	there	were	a	number	of	research	limitations	that	were	also	identified:	
• Variation	in	NFF	terminology	
Project Definition
-Company visits
Outputs
-Literature review
-Resear ch focus
Outputs
-Analysis of NFF
-Identify personnel
-Capture data
Outputs
-Identify process map
-Model Petri net
Data Collection
-Interview with
participants
Data Analysis
-Tacit knowledge and 
experience
-Analysis of interviews
• Limited	access	to	sensitive	industry	NFF	data	and	statistics	
• A	reluctance	in	organisations	to	provide	realistic	responses	to	questions	
• A	time	limit	on	the	academic	literature	review	was	placed	from	1990–present	
• A	large	response	from	a	particular	organisation	may	skew	overall	results	
	
Interviews:	After	an	introduction	to	the	aims	and	objectives	of	the	interviews,	the	participants	were	
advised	to	generously	discuss	their	experiences	while	focusing	on	events	related	to	NFF	risk	
management	and	decision	making.	The	shortest	interview	was	about	40	minutes	and	the	longest	
lasted	at	2	hours.	In	total,	around	6	hours	were	spent	during	the	interview	discussions.	Also,	
interviews	were	recorded	with	the	agreement	with	the	participants	and	where	appropriate,	non-
disclosure	agreements	were	signed	with	their	organisations.	The	organisation	type	of	the	
participants	consisted	of	1	operator,	2	OEMs	and	2	suppliers.	Table	1	presents	an	overview	of	the	
participants	represented	as	in	the	following	roles	or	functions:	
	
Table	1.	List	of	participants	
	
	
Data	collection:	As	groundwork	for	the	interviews	a	brief	checklist	was	developed	within	areas	that	
were	highlighted	during	the	state	of	the	art	(Khan	et	al	2014a,	Khan	et	al	2014b),	and	hence	would	
be	relevant	in	giving	insights	on	how	decision	making	moves	within	the	organisation.	The	questions	
were	prepared	based	on	the	process	proposed	by	Roberts	et	al.	(1994).	From	the	literature	review,	it	
was	evident	that	the	major	causes	for	this	problem	not	only	include	technical	or	design	errors	but	
human	factors	like	organisational,	procedural	and	behavioural	aspects	as	well.	Hence,	apart	from	the	
questions	related	to	the	case	study	and	fault	diagnostic	process,	general	questions	related	to	NFF	
phenomena	were	also	addressed	during	the	interview	in	order	to	get	the	participants’	perspective	
with	regard	to	the	human	factors	issue.	
	 Job	title	 Years	of	experience	
Participant	1	 Reliability	engineer	 12	
Participant	2	 Airworthiness	manager	 8	
Participant	3	 Reliability	manager	 8	
Participant	4	 Technical	director	 18	
Participant	5	 Service	management	 14	
	In	order	to	map	the	decision	making	process	a	questionnaire	template	was	developed	to	capture	the	
details	of	different	diagnostic	stages,	as	covered	in	Table	2.	These	included	queries	surrounding	the	
fault	reporting,	detection	and	data	recording	processes.	
	
Table	2	lists	some	of	the	basic	questions	used	during	one-to-one	interviews.		
Data	collection		 Questions	utilised	to	investigate	the	problem	
Management	process	 Does	your	organisation	have	a	policy	on	NFF?	if	yes,	how	do	you	
implement	it?	
Do	you	recognise	NFF	as	a	major	problem?	
How	do	you	benchmark	NFF	costs	and	resources?	
Do	you	have	dedicated	NFF	managers?	
What	are	the	barriers	to	NFF	issues	that	stop	you	from	investigating	
them?	
In	your	opinion,	what	enhances	the	NFF	decision	making	process?	
Can	you	please	give	an	example	(from	your	experience)	about	your	
management’s	attitude	towards	NFF	events?	
Case	study	information	 Can	you	provide	a	brief	description	of	the	system/service	your	
organisation	delivers?	
Do	you	use	any	system	modelling	techniques?	
What	are	the	major	NFF	susceptible	components	used	in	the	system?	
Can	you	provide	technical	diagram,	drawings,	pictures?	
Reported	fault	 What	was	the	reported	NFF	fault’s	consequence?	
How	often	it	has	been	reported/	occurrence	rate?	
Who	reports	the	fault?	How	are	these	reports	escalated?	
What	were	the	fault	indicators?	
Has	the	process	changed	over	time?	
Fault	reporting	process	 Who	are	the	actors	involved	in	the	reporting	process?	What	are	the	
actions	taken;	how	was	the	reporting	done?	
What	is	your	experience	with	the	process?	
What	were	the	testing	procedures?	
Fault	detection	process	 Who	are	the	actors	involved?	
What	are	the	actions	taken	by	each	actor?	
What	is	the	experience	of	each	actor?	
At	which	level,	or	who	concluded	the	event	as	an	NFF?	
What	were	the	actions	taken	to	identify	the	root	cause?	
Data	recording	process	 Do	you	record	maintenance	data?	
Do	you	have	any	specific	data	recording	method?	
Do	you	share	this	data	with	others?	
Do	you	make	use	of	maintenance	data	history	for	problem	
diagnostics	
Is	it	used	for	training	purposes	of	new	engineers	and	technicians	
	
Based	on	the	authors’	own	experiences	in	a	project	environment,	factors	concerning	political	
sensitivity	and	career	concerns	where	accounted	for	by	speculating	the	direct	economic	impact	of	
decisions	and	whether	if	their	consequences	on	customer	perception.	Other	sensitive	areas	in	this	
context	were	to	speculate	about	how	internal	departmental	interactions	and	relations	between	
maintenance	personnel	influence	the	decision	making	processes.	It	is	expected	that	maintenance	
personnel	will	endeavour	to	push	away	the	NFF	decision	making	process	in	cases	where	they	
experience	high	accountability.		Based	on	this,	questions	were	formed	around	the	situation	and	
problem	escalations	instead.	Another	area	that	was	explored	was	if	the	decision	making	process	was	
influenced	by	ad	hoc	procedures,	e.g.	influences	from	steering	groups,	cross	industry	knowledge,	
informal	communication,	etc.	
	
5	Decision	making	in	a	value	led	organisation	
High	competition	and	under	time	pressure:	The	participants	were	asked	a	series	of	questions	to	
ascertain	the	business	and	time	pressures	they	were	under	in	their	regular	job.	In	a	civil	aviation	
environment,	operators	are	under	tremendous	pressure	to	get	the	grounded	aircraft	back	in	air	to	
generate	revenue.	Therefore	availability	of	the	system	is	paramount	to	the	business	–	perhaps	more	
than	quality	of	service.	Regardless	of	how	contracts	are	agreed,	investigating	NFF	issues	results	in	
wasted	efforts,	delays	and	affects	reputation.	
	
It	is	revealed	that	the	decision	making	during	this	phase	is	usually	managed	on	the	tactical	level	(or	
higher).	There	is	no	transfer	of	decision	downwards	on	the	organisational	hierarchy	at	this	stage.	
Participants	4	and	5	both	admit	that	the	decision	making	is	driven	and	focused	by	considerations	of	
the	competitive	situation	at	hand,	as	well	as	the	strategic	importance.	Participant	5	explained	that	a	
key	driver	behind	decisions	is	that	the	organization	is	cautious	about	customer	satisfaction	and	
hence	will	focus	on	addressing	NFF	reports.	Customers	are	becoming	more	assertive	about	the	cost	
and	resolution	of	these	problems:	“they	replace	an	LRU7	and	observe	that	the	fault	goes	away,	but	
the	maintenance	organization	cannot	find	the	fault	and	has	to	(directly	or	indirectly)	charge	the	
customer	for	it.	If	this	is	the	case,	then,	there	is	no	problem,	and	we	are	advised	to	bury	our	heads	in	
the	sand	and	concentrate	on	the	business	coming	in	and	not	what	we	are	losing…”		
	
Bureaucracy	increases	the	friction	between	the	two	sides.	These	views	are	of	course	subjective,	but	
it	is	necessary	to	acknowledge	the	fact	that	at	some	organizational	level	an	event	had	occurred,	and	
some	decision	was	taken	that	has	resulted	with	an	NFF	decision	during	maintenance.	On	reflection	
of	their	situation,	participant	4	emphasized	the	fierce	competition	amongst	suppliers	–	where	the	
operator	(or	service	provider)	has	existing	equipment	from	various	other	OEM’s,	claimed	that	unless	
the	NFF	events	are	resolve	effectively,	they	would	stop	doing	business	with	the	supplier	in	the	
future.		
	
Both	participants	4	and	5	acknowledge	how	high	stake	decisions	are	made	(both	in	pure	and	direct	
monetary	terms).		Due	to	business	demands	and	the	strategic	importance	of	getting	the	contract,	
NFF	related	decisions	making	keeps	moving	to	the	strategic	level.	According	to	them,	this	is	a	good	
sign	as	their	organisations	have	initiated	measures	for	managing	the	NFF	decision	making	process	
by:	
• Adopting	the	ARINC	6728		
• Investing	in	training	
	
Key	stakeholder	criticism:	Even	though	NFF	is	not	explicitly	recognised	within	their	contracts,	the	
maintenance	managers	make	a	conscious	effort	to	keep	key	stakeholders	informed	about	the	rogue	
units	on	a	regular	basis	to	avoid	any	criticism.	According	to	participant	4,	this	initiative	started	as	bi-
weekly	bulletins	to	foster	knowledge	sharing	and	to	open	up	a	communications	channel	between	
their	organisation	and	its	customers.	The	technical	director	further	explained	that	the	purpose	was	
																																								 																				
7	A	Line	replaceable	Unit	(LRU)	is	a	modular	component	that	is	designed	to	be	replaced	quickly	at	an	operating	
location.	It	is	usually	a	sealed	unit,	used	to	improve	maintenance	operations,	because	they	can	be	stocked	and	
replaced	quickly	from	on-site	inventory,	restoring	the	system	to	service,	while	the	failed	LRU	is	undergoing	
maintenance.	Because	they	are	modular,	they	also	reduce	system	costs	and	increase	quality,	by	centralizing	
development	across	different	system	platforms.	
8	The	ARINC	672	is	a	set	of	NFF	guidelines	that	were	introduced	a	generic	procedure	that	can	help	understand	
the	fundamental	principles,	relationships,	mechanisms	and	interactions	connected	to	NFF	failure	situations.	It	
provides	criterions	for	decision	taking	regarding	root	causes,	and	describes	the	importance	of	taking	
maintenance	actions	at	an	early	stage	of	the	component	repair	cycle.	It	further	highlights	the	necessary	means	
of	reducing	costs	by	avoiding	unwanted	removing	units	from	the	aircraft	(Khan	et	al,	2014a).	
to	share	information	in	order	to	secure	that	all	key	stakeholders	were	acting	based	on	the	same	
information.		
Furthermore,	the	ambition	to	keep	a	wide	forum	of	stakeholders	informed	also	indicates	a	means	to	
avoid	self-reproach	in	case	situations	should	affect	later	–	by	being	able	to	argue	that	many	people	
were	aware	of	what	was	going	on	and	could	have	taken	action.	On	the	contrary,	by	stating	that:	“we	
are	a	good	organisation	to	work	with...”,	it	is	all	about	saving	the	situation.	When	reflecting	over	
reproach	on	an	organisational	level,	the	director	indicated	that	avoidance	of	reproach	actually	is	a	
driving	force	behind	the	information	sharing	as	it	was	based	on	personal	experience	of	the	situation	
and	not	in	the	organisational	culture.	
	
Lack	of	alternatives:	When	asked	about	such	situations	where	critical	decisions	had	to	be	made	
(with	limited	alternatives),	the	participants	emphasized	that	after	evaluating	the	possibilities,	they	
are	limited	to	the	written	procedures	set	out	in	the	service	manuals.	In	these	situations,	operators	
are	usually	advised	to	return	questionable	units	back	to	the	OEM	for	further	testing.		
A	challenging	part	in	aerospace	maintenance	can	be	attributed	to	its	equipment	design.	With	a	drive	
towards	a	more	electric	aircraft,	there	is	a	drive	towards	more	functional	integration	of	built	in	tests.	
Unfortunately,	much	of	the	technical	skills	required	to	manage	these	systems	can	be	limited	in	
isolating	all	faults	–	at	least	to	a	level	where	only	the	offending	equipment	requires	removal.	In	such	
situations,	there	are	no	alternatives	as	the	management	applications	that	cope	with	fault	
investigations	are	limited	and	do	not	provide	the	required	visibility.		
	
The	participants	voiced	this	concern	and	expressed	their	need	for	the	additional	fault	detection	
alternatives	within	their	standard	testing,	including	for	intermittent	faults,	transient	faults	and	false	
alarms.	However,	there	was	no	universal	agreement	on	how	the	capability	should	be	classified	and	
processed,	or	even	the	level	of	granularity	that	must	be	included.	
	
Deliberate	oversight:	When	asked	to	elaborate	why	maintenance	teams	do	not	formally	escalate	an	
increase	in	NFF	situations	to	their	strategic	level,	participants	1	and	4	gave	a	picture	of	a	situation	
that	was	severely	influenced	by	organisational	and	personnel	issues.		Both	participants	emphasized	
that	their	teams	endeavoured	to	manage	the	situation	at	their	operational	level;	and	in	cooperation	
with	customer	as	far	as	possible.	However,	at	times	some	personnel	become	defensive	in	these	
situations	and	do	not	accept	responsibility.		It	was	further	emphasized	that	the	consequences	of	
technical	flaws	can	accumulate	by	a	mix	of	problems	with:	
• Personal	relations	within	the	team	
• Lack	of	overall	system	knowledge,	or	inexperience	
• Insufficient	personal	competence	together	with	low	motivation	
	
When	there	are	no	alternative	options	but	to	return	the	unit	(there	are	no	obvious	technical	
deficiencies	that	showed	in	the	unit	acceptance	test),	the	operational	level	made	their	decisions	
without	escalation	(or	even	informing	higher	management	about	it).	Similarly,	in	light	of	the	
technical,	organisational	and	personnel	related	issues,	maintenance	personnel	maintained	the	
decision	making	within	their	teams.		The	situation	is	made	worse	when	there	is	not	enough	time	to	
verify	and	validate	even	a	small	fraction	of	a	system	faults	during	formal	testing:	“An	aircraft	may	
have	a	fault	universe	of	12,000	faults…	but	the	budget,	schedule	and	other	practical	test	
considerations	may	whittle	that	number	down	to	200	highly-probable	faults	being	tested	during	
developmental	tests”.	
	
Further	to	the	abovementioned,	difficulties	in	getting	attention	from	the	strategic	level	also	
constrained	the	issue	of	decision	making.	Participant	3	expressed	the	difficulties	faced	with	
organising	urgent	meetings:	"I	tried	to	call	for	a	meeting	on	our	rogue	units.	First	we	talk	internally,	
and	then	I	called	for	meetings,	but	management	could	not	join.	They	had	other	priorities.	However,	
sometimes	these	issues	cannot	wait	a	week	or	10	days.	They	needed	to	take	place	the	day	after	or	
so".	Participant	1	summarises	his	experiences	with	NFF	events,	concluding	that	the	“our	steering	
group	is	not	particularly	supportive	as	they	cannot	visually	see	the	impact	of	the	problem.	We	have	
no	cost	metrics,	so	unless	there	is	someone	who	has	experienced	NFF	in	the	steering	group,	nothing	
changes”.		It	was	also	mentioned	that	the	rule	of	thumb	introduced	in	the	organisation	is	to	discard	a	
unit	if	it	has	been	tagged	as	“NFF”	three	times	during	service	–	as	an	attempt	to	control	rogue	units	
in	their	inventory.	
	
Participant	5	raised	an	opinion	that	a	year	old	request	for	additional	training	support	with	NFF	
components	did	not	materialise	(at	least	at	the	time	of	the	interview),	and	elaborated	on	the	topic	
saying	that	“I	believe	I'm	right	in	what	I'm	saying;	as	we	see	a	rise	in	the	number	of	such	problems…	
no	one	was	interested	in	addressing	the	root.	OEMs	make	a	profit	from	their	additional	testing	
therefore	there	is	no	incentive	to	solve	the	problem.	Sometimes	we	just	shout	‘solve	the	problem’	or	
‘this	is	unacceptable’.		This	is	why	we	need	more	training	so	that	we	can	deal	with	them	ourselves;	
as	much	as	we	can….	there	is	no	help	to	be	expected,	except	for	the	help	we	can	give	ourselves”.		
5.1	Critique	on	NFF	decision	making	
The	literature	and	interviews	indicate	a	general	organisational	outlook	on	NFF	decision	making	as	
shown	in	Table	3:	
	
Table	3.	Organisational	levels	and	drivers	for	NFF	
Organisational	level	 Drivers	
Strategic	 Accountability	
High	degree	of	uniqueness	
High	political	stake	
Tactical	
Operational	
Operational	pressures	
Delegation	of	decisions	
	
Although	organisations	promote	and	encourage	delegation	of	decision	making	and	support,	they	
expect	rigid	structures	and	procedures	for	decision	making	to	be	implemented.	It	was	also	noted	
that	these	structures	and	procedures	are	not	fully	utilised,	i.e.	there	is	a	considerable	difference	
between	what	is	expected	and	how	it	is	actually	done.		
	
Moreover,	the	company	values	and	culture	provide	a	general	policy	with	guidelines	for	risk,	issue-	
and	non-conformity	management	in	commercial	projects,	as	well	as	for	managing	customer	claims	
and	warranty	issues	–	all	decisions	with	a	financial	impact	are	required	to	follow	the	general	
authorisation	routine.	In	these	authorisation	routines,	specific	monetary	limits	are	set	for	the	
undersigning	at	different	organisational	levels.	The	picture	that	emerges	here	is	that	the	decision	
making	is	being	controlled,	subject	to	rigid	structures	and	seems	to	transfer	important	decisions	
towards	the	top	level	management.				
	
When	reflecting	back	on	one	example	of	NFF	escalation,	participant	1	describes	a	situation	in	which	
they	did	not	demonstrate	or	utilise	the	existing	structures	for	issue	management:	"I	had	escalated,	
e.g.	in	emails	to	Mr	X	and	Mr	Y	...	but	since	uncomfortable	decisions	had	to	be	taken…	or	
uncomfortable	calls	to	be	made,	I	didn’t	hear	back	for	months...	I	should	have	acted	in	another	way	
and	instead	called	for	a	meeting,	with	protocol.	Now	the	only	thing	that	exists	is	an	email	as	
evidence.	I	only	spoke	with	someone	and	went	back	believing	that	something	should	happen.	Then	a	
few	months	later	the	issue	came	up	in	another	forum,	with	another	customer.”		
	
This	lesson	learnt	is	important	for	managers	–	it	is	necessary	to	be	formal	and	evidence	efforts.		
Furthermore,	participant	1	reflecting	over	these	matters	stated:	“In	the	beginning,	most	decisions	
are	taken	by	the	project	requirements.	Then,	as	operational	pressures	kick	in,	decisions	escalate	to	
some	kind	of	steering	group	level.	If	nothing	happens	after	that,	the	manager	loses	control	totally”.		
According	to	Geraldi	et	al.	(2010),	political	support	and	the	sense	of	urgency	are	of	great	relevance	
for	an	organisation’s	ability	to	manage	events.	This	argument	can	be	extended	to	NFF	problems.		
	
In	the	context	of	escalation,	participants	were	asked	to	elaborate	on	the	support	they	were	given	or	
expected	to	get	from	higher	levels	in	the	organisation;	a	mixed	picture	emerged.	At	one	end,	the	
organisational	culture	and	ethos	is	generally	perceived	and	described	as	supporting	and	safe	for	the	
individual,	exemplified	by	one	participant	stating	that	“We	are	a	very	pleasant	organisation	to	work	
for…	no	negative	spiral.	Instead	it’s	all	about	saving	the	situation	and	then	move	on.	That	is	very	
positive”.	However,	when	reflecting	over	and	elaborating	on	the	same	topic,	specifically	for	NFF	
related	issues,	the	feedback	was	more	critical	with	statements	such	as	that	“the	steering	group	was	
not	particularly	supportive”	or	even	as	one	participant	described:	"A	highly	personal	reflection,	but	
when	talking	about	NFF	costs	and	how	to	manage	these,	my	feeling	is	that	the	function	of	the	
steering	group	is	more	like	a	mirror	which	you	put	up	and	if	you	shout	into	it	you	will	only	see	
yourself.	To	escalate	and	say	that	we	have	a	training	problem	or	budgeting	problem	…	I	feel	that	it	
would	not	help.	Instead	it	would	only	have	come	back	to	us	to	go	and	solve	the	issue...”.		The	
struggle	for	attention,	support	and	low	sense	of	urgency	were	also	pointed	out	by	participant	3	who	
struggled	with	arranging	a	meeting	on	rogue	units.		
These	interviews	evidence	that	due	to	the	lack	of	political	support	and	low	sense	of	urgency,	there	
seems	to	be	a	lack	of	trust	to	get	constructive	support	to	manage	or	resolve	issues.	This	was	one	of	
the	major	factors	that	constrained	NFF	related	decisions	within	the	organisation.	Kruke	&	Olsen	
(2012)	advocate	that	collective	understanding	of	an	organisation’s	strategies	and	routines	imply	that	
decision	making	could	be	transferred	according	to	the	need	of	the	situation.	From	an	NFF	point	of	
view,	there	are	no	obvious	indications	on	instances	where	this	type	of	understanding	has	succeeded.	
What	this	study	does	confirm	is	that	accountability	is	an	important	characteristic.	However,	the	
perceptions	of	individuals	involved	in	the	situation	(who	subject	to	high	accountability)	play	an	
important	role.	Table	4	summarises	the	NFF	decision	making	drivers.		
	
Table	4.	NFF	decision	making	drivers	
What	enhances	NFF	decision	making?	 What	limits	NFF	decision	making?	
• Having	alternatives	
• Key	stakeholder	involvement	
• Promoting	group	value	instead	of	
individual	efforts	
• Strategic	level	policy	
• Informal	networks	
• Adequate	training	
• Organisation	ethos	
• High	political	stake	(varying	business	
interests)	
• Non-routine	situations	(inexperience)	
• Business	pressures	
• Lack	of	management	attention	
• Resource	limitations	
• Lack	of	training	
• Organisation	ethos	
	
It	should	be	clear	that	an	organisation’s	culture	will	heavily	influence	all	identified	drivers.	
Many	engineers	(including	the	participants)	have	expressed	that	with	complexity	and	high	
functionality	come	benefits	but	also	frustration	when	things	do	not	work	the	way	they	are	expected	
to.	Training	(or	at	least	clear	guidance)	is	thus	often	more	a	necessity	than	a	'nice	to	have'	option.	
The	younger	generation	of	engineers	seems	reluctant	to	read	a	manual,	whereas	the	older	
generations	struggle	to	find	the	manual	on-line.	Overall	this	analysis	illustrates	that	NFF	events	are	
not	just	technical	issues	but	strong	cultural	and	experience	related	influences.	Aspects	of	human	
behavioural	understanding	are	therefore	required	to	control	NFF	events.	Therefore,	the	most	
prominent	driver	for	enhancing/constraining	the	NFF	decision	making	process	is	training.		
	
5.2	Management	of	“decisions”		
The	management	of	NFF	events	can	be	viewed	as	stable	cognitive	processes	and	variations	in	action	
patterns;	such	as	maintaining	ongoing	focus	on	reported	fault,	simplified	diagnostic	process,	current	
organisational	culture	and	expert	knowledge	(Pickthall,	2014).	An	effective	way	to	control	its	effects	
will	be	through	the	use	of	policies.	Such	an	approach	can	help	in	achieving	objectives	and	can	
indicate	a	course	of	actions	to	cope	with	situations	when	they	take	place.	However,	organisations	
seldom	define	NFF	related	policies,	and	hence	they	rarely	exist	in	any	written	form.	Recently,	Khan	
et	al	(2015)	worked	towards	establishing	policy	requirements	related	to	NFF	events,	that	can	help	
strategic	level	management	recognise	the	interrelationships	that	exist	between	the	various	functions	
(or	departments)	of	the	organisation.	The	aim	is	to	promote	an	industry-wide	understanding	of	the	
principal	causes	that	result	in	the	NFF	phenomena:	
• The	scope	and	limits	of	NFF	events:	For	an	organisation,	this	will	determine	what	is	within	its	
terms	of	reference	(jurisdiction)	for	NFF	investigation,	and	what	should	be	excluded.	This	is	
not	an	argument	against	including	(or	excluding)	particular	NFF	events,	but	stress	that	such	a	
decision	should	be	on	the	basis	of	explicit	directives,	definitions	and	mutual	understanding	
with	the	organisation	(or	sector).	
	
• Type	and	level	of	troubleshooting	expected:	This	refers	to	the	amount	and	intensity	of	the	
troubleshooting	that	is	expected	to	provide	the	answer	if	a	component	must	be	removed	or	
not.	E.g.	what	levels	of	checks	are	required	on	suspected	units,	how	many	times	can	a	rogue	
unit	be	put	back	into	service?	As	pointed	out	by	some	of	the	participant;	their	organisations	
have	developed	a	rule	on	rogue	units	where	they	would	remove	a	unit	from	service	if	it	has	
been	tagged	as	an	NFF	three	times.	Of	course,	such	factors	will	rely	on	establishing	a	balance	
between	the	costs	incurred	and	the	time	taken	to	carry	out	the	troubleshooting	process.	
	
• Role	and	Responsibilities	of	management:	Investigating	NFF	is	not	just	a	peripheral	activity	
within	an	organisation,	and	this	must	be	reflected	within	its	senior	management	in	order	to	
establish	mutual	perceptions	with	regards	to	the	consequence	of	NFF	on	an	organisation.	
Principally,	managers	participate	in	(or	facilitate)	the	decision-making	process	for	the	
allocation	of	resources,	the	development	and	implementation	of	strategic	plans,	the	
establishment	of	intervention	and	control	strategies.	The	interviews	have	evidenced	that	
political	support	and	a	sense	of	urgency	from	senior	management	can	help	resolve	issues	
early.	
	
• Personnel	practices:	Other	essential	factors	that	need	to	be	covered	within	a	NFF	policy	
include	reporting	and	training	–	which	was	recognised	as	the	most	prominent	driver	for	
enhancing/constraining	the	NFF	decision	making	process.	Adequate	reporting	can	ensure	
that	correct	and	sufficient	data	is	collected	and	recorded	to	allow	maintainers	at	all	levels	in	
Figure	1	to	have	the	complete	fault	history	of	a	suspected	component.	This	may	include	
reports	from	manufacturers	(or	subcontractors)	with	a	component	on	its	return,	detailing	
the	original	fault	and	any	work	which	was	carried	out.	Furthermore,	the	effectiveness	of	a	
maintenance	system	can	only	be	as	good	as	the	people	who	control	it,	and	therefore	no	
effort	should	be	spared	when	it	comes	to	training.	
	
This	above	list	provides	the	building	blocks	for	an	NFF	policy	that	can	assist	design,	management	and	
maintenance	personnel	to	make	sound	decisions.	Its	implementation	requires	sufficient	knowledge	
regarding	the	business	and	the	ability	to	accommodate	existing	requirements	within	available	
means.	Now	that	an	NFF	policy	requirement	has	been	laid	down,	the	authors	of	this	paper	would	like	
to	classify	the	NFF	phenomenon	into	five	key	processes	–	which	need	to	be	controlled.	The	
motivation	for	the	classification	is	to	enables	simultaneous	adaptive	learning	and	reliable	
performance.	Weick	et	al	(2008)	have	suggested	that	these	processes	can	help	represent	theoretical	
developments	on	the	root	cause	of	events.	The	goal	here	is	to	adapt	these	processes	in	the	NFF	
context	and	use	the	defined	NFF	management	policy	to	regulate	them.		
	
Consider	the	following	two	categories:		
1. Fault	detection:	this	deals	with	the	processes	(i)	preoccupation	with	failure,	(ii)	the	
reluctance	to	simplify	and	(iii)	sensitivity	to	operations.		
2. Fault	isolation	and	recovery:	this	deals	with	processes	(Iv)	commitment	to	resilience	and	(v)	
deference	to	expertise.	
	
Although	straight	forward,	for	NFF	investigations	there	might	be	a	challenge	to	control	these	
processes	into	practice	(e.g.	they	warrant	paying	attention	to	failures	that	cannot	be	verified	rather	
than	successful	troubleshooting	and	encourages	getting	better	at	being	reactive	instead	of	proactive	
plans).	Some	authors	have	even	argued	against	the	processes	of	anticipation,	where	“the	warning	
signs	are	only	obvious	in	retrospect	and	that	it	is	often	not	possible	to	discern	their	significance	
beforehand”	(Hopkins,	2007).	The	processes	of	anticipation	have	also	been	criticised	from	the	
standpoint	that	picking	up	the	almost	infinite	number	of	weak	signals	existing	in	the	organisational	
environment	is	far	beyond	the	human,	technological	and	organisational	capability	in	most	
organisations.	However,	the	authors	of	this	paper	advocate	that	regulated	anticipation,	from	the	
standpoint	that	organisations	that	have	less	than	their	fair	share	of	NFF	problems,	may	be	better	in	
appreciating	the	significance	of	such	events.	The	following	discusses	details	of	the	control	process:	
	
Anticipation:	
i. Preoccupation	with	failure:	Preoccupation	with	failure	is	the	first	process	of	anticipation	and	
at	the	heart	of	this	process	lays	efforts	into	detecting	small	emerging	failures.	These	might	
hold	evidence	about	other	failures	elsewhere	in	the	system,	as	well	as	identifying	and	
specifying	significant	mistakes	that	must	be	avoided.	Organisational	success	contributes	to	
narrowing	perceptions,	changing	attitudes,	reinforcing	one	way	of	doing	business	and,	more	
importantly,	having	the	confidence	in	current	practice.	The	fact	is	that	success	leads	to	
complacency,	which	increases	the	likelihood	of	an	NFF	event	going	unnoticed	for	a	long	time	
–	possibly	resulting	in	a	bigger	financial	problem.		
This	indicates	that	it	is	better	to	be	preoccupied	with	failure	reports	instead	of	successful	
troubleshooting.	Paying	close	attention	to	early	NFF	indicators,	relentlessly	searching	for	
symptoms	of	malfunction,	as	well	as	sharing	knowledge	about	mistakes	engineers	make,	all	
are	instrumental	for	the	process	of	anticipation.	
	
ii. Reluctance	to	simplify:	The	second	process	of	anticipation	is	reluctance	to	simplify.	To	
achieve	higher	system	reliability,	designers	often	appear	reluctant	to	simplifications,	as	
these	are	likely	to	increase	eventual	surprises	and	inconsistencies.		Reluctance	to	simplify	
implies	that	“with	more	differentiation	comes	a	richer	and	more	varied	picture	of	potential	
consequences,	which	in	turn	suggests	a	richer	and	more	varied	set	of	precautions	and	early	
warning	signs”	(Weick	&	Sutcliffe,	2007,	p53).	
Minor	failure	reports	act	as	warnings	to	larger	problems.	Being	able	to	detect	these	weak	
signals	of	impending	failures	warrants	attention	to	sufficient	level	of	detail,	including	actively	
seeking	to	anticipate	and	isolate	failures	as	they	occur.	To	be	able	to	predict,	detect	and	
isolate	more,	designers	need	to	resist	over	simplifying	processes	and	even	take	
premeditated	steps	to	consciously	record	event	descriptions,	as	well	as	encouraging	
diversity	in	teams	and	negotiating	different	views.		
	
iii. Sensitivity	to	operations:	The	final	principle	of	anticipation,	sensitivity	to	operations,	is	
concerned	with	the	job	carried	out,	rather	then	what	was	supposed	to	be	done.	Weick	and	
Sutcliffe	(2007)	elaborated	on	threats	to	sensitivity	in	operations:	
o The	engineering	culture	where	a	high	value	is	put	on	quantifiable,	measurable	and	
public	knowledge	rather	than	on	the	more	experiential	knowledge;	which	is	often	
required	for	operators	to	fulfil	the	engineers’	intentions.	The	author’s	stressed	that	
neither	of	these	forms	of	knowledge	stands	higher	than	the	other.		
o Another	threat	is	associated	with	the	tendency	of	routine	tasks	to	become	
mindless9,	where	mindless	in	this	context	has	the	meaning	of	automatic.	Careful	
execution	of	such	tasks	includes	consciously	adapting	and	reworking	them	to	fit	
changed	conditions	and	new	learning.		
o The	final	threat,	to	sensitivity	to	operations,	is	the	overestimation	of	an	
organisation’s	own	soundness	that	happens	when	incorrect	conclusions	are	drawn	
from	symptoms	about	the	root	cause	of	the	problem.		
		
																																								 																				
9	i.e.	acting	or	done	without	justification	and	with	no	concern	for	the	consequences.	
Containment:	
iv. Commitment	to	resilience:	Organisations	recognize	the	inevitability	of	errors	and	therefore	
pay	extra	attention	not	only	to	error	prevention	and	detection	(anticipation),	but	also	to	
containment.	Commitment	to	resilience	is	the	first	process	of	containment.	These	processes	
are	geared	towards	recovering	from	setbacks	and	restoring	a	systems	ability	to	restore	itself	
after	unanticipated	events.		
	
v. Deference	to	expertise:	Deference	to	expertise	is	the	second	process	of	containment.	This	
process	focuses	on	the	ability	to	shift	decision	making	to	those	with	the	highest	expertise	
related	to	the	situation	at	hand,	irrespective	of	their	status	in	the	organisational	hierarchy.	
Deference	to	expertise	is	made	possible	by	under	specification	of	structures10.	Specification	
of	structures	was	studied	by	Mannarelli	et	al	(1996)	who	found	that	organisations	reduced	
potential	errors	by	delegating	the	decision	making	process	and	responsibility;	structuring	
themselves	to	quickly	move	from	completely	centralized	decision	making	and	hierarchy,	
during	periods	of	relative	calm,	into	a	completely	decentralized	and	flat	decision	structures,	
during	pressure	situations.	Furthermore,	Weick	(2006)	emphasizes	that	both,	decision	
making	structures	and	the	expertise,	identified	with	specific	people	(or	positions)	are	
temporary.	In	fact,	Weick	&	Sutcliffe	(2007)	make	an	important	distinction	between	experts	
and	expertise	arguing	that	the	latter	is	a	collection	of	knowledge,	experience,	learning,	and	
intuitions	that	is	seldom	embodied	in	a	single	individual.	This	knowledge	usually	stays	hidden	
in	the	heads	of	few	key	engineers	who	have	acquired	through	years	of	experience	and	
training.	The	mission	is	to	disseminate	this	knowledge	to	others	(Khan	et	al,	2014b).	
	
The	next	section	makes	use	of	the	research	work	to	map	the	NFF	process	within	as	a	Petri	net	model.	
Such	a	model	will	be	useful	in	visualising	the	areas	where	the	NFF	decision	making	can	have	the	
greatest	impact.	
6	Petri	Nets	
Petri	 Nets	 are	 an	 intuitive	 formal	 graphical	 representation	 used	 to	 model	 complex	 concurrent	
systems.	Constructed	as	bipartite	graphs	they	contain	two	classes	of	nodes,	places	and	transitions,	
connected	 by	 directed	 arcs.	 Based	 upon	 discrete	 events	 they	 have	 been	 expanded	 to	 include	
stochastic,	 continuous,	 hybrid	 and	 high-level	 nets	 (Machado	 et	 al,	 2009).	 They	 have	 been	 widely	
																																								 																				
10	Under	specification	is	the	degree	of	specification	in	a	decision	making	structure	to	which	rules	and	
procedures	govern	decision	situations	such	that	they	become	routinized.	In	contrasts,	over	specification	is	the	
degree	of	specification	in	a	decision	making	structure	that	narrows	the	focus	of	attention	(adding	granularity).	
used	 as	 a	 modelling	 language	 for	 a	 number	 of	 applications,	 for	 example	 manufacturing	 process	
design,	workflow	management	and	systems	biology	(Simao	et	al,	2005).		
	
Figure	 3	 illustrates	 the	 basics	 of	 Petri	 nets	which	 consists	 of	 places	 (shown	 as	 circles),	 transitions	
(shown	as	bars)	and	arcs,	which	can	run	from	a	place	to	transition	or	vice	versa.	A	marking	(shown	as	
black	dots)	represent	a	configuration	of	a	place,	and	consist	of	a	number	of	tokens.	The	firing	of	a	
place	towards	a	transition	 is	dependent	on	the	configuration	of	tokens	present,	upon	doing	so	the	
tokens	are	consumed	and	output	tokens	are	then	created	in	the	output	place.	More	information	on	
Petri	nets	can	be	reviewed	in	Cabasino	(2009),	Lin	et	al	(1993)	and	Sampath	et	al	(1995).	
	
Figure	3:	Petri	net	example	
Over	the	years,	the	concept	of	Petri	Nets	has	been	used	to	study	the	dynamics	of	decision	making	
organizations.	This	is	carried	out	by	using	tokens	in	the	places	of	a	net	and	then	analysing	these	as	a	
result	of	the	structure	of	the	net	and	the	protocols	in	its	description	(Boettcher,	1982).	These	models	
are	effective	in	illustrating	the	flow	of	information	within	organizations;	where	the	tokens	represent	
information	carriers	that	wait	to	be	processed	at	places.		These	places	are	conditions	which	must	be	
met	before	the	information	held	in	them	can	be	processed.	Consecutively,	transitions	are	events	
that	process	and	transform	this	information.		This	transformation	could	include	analysis,	synthesis,	
transfer	from	one	point	to	another,	or	computation	(Reisig,	2012).	
	
Levis	(1984)	described	how	to	express	decision	making	organizations	by	a	mathematical	framework.		
This	work	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	within	these	organizations	there	are	a	group	of	decision	
makers	who	execute	clear	tasks;	each	one	limited	by	his	bounded	logic11.		When	carrying	out	a	task,	
the	decision	makers	may	be	faced	with	several	options	–	these	can	be	represented	as	different	
algorithms	to	process	information,	decision	aids,	training,	etc.	The	approach	used	to	select	from	
these	options	can	have	varying	effects	on	the	performance	of	the	organization,	therefore,	the	
fundamental	constituent	for	defining	an	organization	is	to	model	the	interacting	decision.	
	
																																								 																				
11	These	limits	are	on	the	amount	of	information	that	a	human	can	understand	and	process.	
6.1	Modelling	NFF	decision	making		
The	authors	explore	how	the	NFF	decision	making	process	can	be	captured	using	the	concept	of	
Petri	nets.	Consider	Figures	4-6	that	consists	of	three	decision	making	entities.	The	variables	used	in	
the	images	are	listed	in	Table	5.	In	the	figures,	the	NFF	decision	making	process	has	been	divided	
into	4	phases:	problem	assessment,	collection	and	fusion,	command	and	response	selection.	These	
phases	take	place	within	each	organisation	i.e.	operator,	OEM	and	supplier.	
	
The	Operator	(NFF1)	must	make	a	decision	if	they	want	to	spend	their	resources	(e.g.	resources,	
maintenance	costs,	etc)	or	not	in	the	troubleshooting	process	to	search	for	the	root	cause	of	the	
problem.	This	indicates	the	initial	dilemma	when	there	is	an	“arising”	–	this	has	been	denoted	by	the	
transition/switch	TSL.	Depending	on	how	the	contracts	have	been	setup,	the	operator	also	has	the	
option	to	either	send	the	suspected	unit	back	to	their	system	providers	(e.g.	the	OEM,	integrators	–	
NFF2)	or	discard	it.		
Discarding	a	unit	can	be	expensive	and	hence	is	not	the	preferable	choice.	If	the	unit	is	not	sent	
back,	the	operator	will	use	their	own	experience	and	troubleshooting	strategies	to	investigate	the	
problem	and	make	a	decision.	If	unit	is	sent	back	to	the	system	provider,	they	need	to	make	sure	
they	also	send	over	extra	situational	information	–	such	as	the	environmental	conditions,	basic	tests	
carried	out,	etc.		
	
When	the	NFF2	(Figure	5)	receives	the	unit,	they	need	to	make	the	decision	to	either:	
1. Do	extra	tests	to	find	the	problem	
2. Return	the	unit	back	to	the	operator	if	they	cannot	find	anything	wrong	with	the	unit	
3. Send	the	unit	to	the	supplier	for	further	tests	
4. Discard	the	current	unit	and	send	the	operator	a	new	one	
	
The	first	two	options	are	standard	practices.	The	latter	two	options	are	expensive	solutions	to	
problem	–	which	carries	no	guarantee	that	it	will	address	the	root	cause	of	the	NFF	arising	at	the	
operator12.	
																																								 																				
12	It	could	be	that	there	is	no	technical	problem	with	the	suspected	unit,	and	the	NFF	event	is	related	to	a	
human	factors	problem	at	the	operator’s	end.	
	
Figure	4:	The	NFF	process	map	at	the	operator	
	
Figure	5:	The	NFF	process	map	at	the	system	provider	
	
Figure	6:	The	NFF	process	map	at	the	supplier	
	
Table	5:	List	of	variables	and	their	definitions	
Variables	 Definition	
z	 is	an	assessment	of	the	situation	that	we	have	an	NFF	component	
P(u)	 is	the	number	of	diagnostics	you	run	to		clear	the	problem	
z1	 Operating	environmental	information	
z2	 Simulative	environmental	information	
z3	 Unit	environmental	information	
Extra Info 
[z1]
Business 
Pressure 
[v1]
NFF Arising 
[x]
Decision 
Rule [p(u)]
Operator: NFF1
Problem Assessment Collection and Fusion Command Response Selection: 
What to do with NFF?
Extra Info 
[z2]
Business 
Pressure 
[v2]
Y1
System Provider: NFF2
W1
W2
W3
W4
Decision 
Rule [p1(v)]
Extra Info 
[z3]
Business 
Pressure 
[v3]
U1
U2
U3
Supplier: NFF3
W1
z’	 revised	assessment	
v1,v2,v3	 management	and	business	pressure	
Y1	 send	unit	to	system	provider	
Y2	 do	not	send	unit,	solve	problem	yourself	
Y3	 do	nothing/ignore	
W1	 Send	unit	to	supplier	
W2	 Send	unit	back	to	operator	
W3	 Do	extra	tests	on	unit	
W4	 discard	unit	and	send	new	one	to	operator	
U1	 send	unit	back	to	system	provider	
U2	 Do	extra	tests	
U3	 discard	unit	and	send	new	one	to	system	provider	
	
Depending	on	the	organisation’s	reputation	and	how	their	business	relations	are	with	each	other,	it	
is	likely	that	the	choices	might	be	evident	to	some	members	of	the	organisation.	However,	there	is	
still	a	high	degree	of	ambiguity	surrounding	the	phenomenon.		
	
Note:	The	further	up	you	go	with	NFF1,	NFF2…	NFFx,	the	more	difficult	is	becomes	to	relate	the	
symptom	to	the	root	cause.	This	is	will	also	incur	greater	costs.	This	is	not	only	due	to	the	business	
interests	of	each	organisation,	but	also	the	lack	of	information	surrounding	the	problem	context	–	
unless	these	organisations	have	some	communication	channels	open.	
	
6.2	Discussion	
The	case	studies	showed	how	firms	manage	integrated	NFF	related	information	flow	around	and	
how	this	can	play	an	important	role	in	their	accountability	for	industrial	maintenance	delivery.	This	
accountability	concerns	the	ability	to	promptly	take	actions	without	reducing	the	quality	of	
decisions.	The	ability	in	supply	chains	is	impacted	by	partnership	uncertainty	which	is	due	to	partner	
involvement,	relationships	and	behaviour.	Partnering	impacts	on	industrial	maintenance	targets	
when	the	services	are	delivered	as	part	of	networks	and	the	sharing	of	information	is	central	to	long	
term	thinking	inside	networks.	Within	major	firms	that	provide	aerospace	services,	the	potential	for	
partnership	uncertainty	is	confronted	primarily	through	an	emphasis	on	congruity	for	technology	
platform	supported	by	industrial	maintenance	and	on	strategizing	service	phase	duologues	between	
customers	and	partners	through	the	use	of	bespoke	and	third	party	information	systems.	
	
Uncertainty	associated	with	delivering	industrial	maintenance	is	experienced	across	the	supply	
network.		Uncertainty	entails	a	difference	between	anticipated	or	predicted	outcome	and	future	
actual	outcome	(Refsgaard	et	al,	2007).	There	are	two	forms	of	uncertainty:	1)	Ambiguity:	Derives	
from	lack	of	information	or	knowledge	i.e.	fuzziness	or	ambiguity,	2)	Fundamental:	Unimaginable	
future	event.	Hence,	uncertainty	is	driven	by	both	lack	of	information	and	poor	timeliness	of	its	
availability.	
	
Within	the	NFF	context	the	operator	faces	uncertainty	in	a	number	of	areas	including	the	problem	
definition	process,	and	in	defining	what	action	needs	to	be	taken.	The	problem	definition	is	
uncertain	due	to	a	lack	of	knowledge	about	the	amount	of	effort	required	to	realise	whether	NFF	is	
experienced.	In	this	process	the	number	of	diagnostics	run	will	vary	depending	on	system	criticality,	
safety	concerns	and	budget	constraints.	A	major	source	of	the	uncertainty	in	this	process	is	
associated	with	the	availability	of	reliable	and	comprehensive	data	about	the	operating	
environment.	Analysing	such	data	can	offer	an	insight	into	the	root	causes	of	NFF	events.	The	
operator	also	faces	uncertainty	to	choose	a	suitable	action	to	resolve	NFF.	In	this	process	various	
options	are	present	such	as	sending	the	unit	to	the	system	provider,	solving	the	problem	yourself	
and	doing	nothing.	The	uncertainty	of	each	option	has	cost	and	performance	impact	that	needs	to	
be	measured.		
	
In	contrast	to	the	operator	the	system	provider	faces	uncertainty	over	the	number	of	units	that	will	
be	sent.	In	this	instance	a	lack	of	information	flow	about	the	equipment	utilisation	and	health	will	
create	further	challenges	in	terms	of	making	resources	available	to	respond	to	the	operator	needs.	
In	this	process	the	degree	of	business	pressure	is	also	uncertain,	which	can	also	affect	the	resources	
available.	Hence	this	may	affect	the	duration	it	takes	to	get	a	unit	fixed	or	replaced.	For	example,	if	
the	unit	is	considered	to	lack	commercial	advantages	the	system	provider	may	consider	terminating	
the	provision	of	the	unit	and	creating	obsolescence	challenges.	Obsolescence	refers	to	the	
unavailability	of	parts,	or	services,	that	were	previously	available	(IIOM	2015).	The	existence	of	
obsolescence	opens	up	a	range	of	options	to	resolve	its	impact	on	operational	readiness.	The	
options	range	from	system	redesign	to	emulation,	reclamation	and	last	time	buy.	An	extreme	
resolution	of	this	process	would	be	sourcing	counterfeit	units	from	suppliers	that	would	harm	the	
system,	whole	life	costs	and	create	further	safety	concerns.			
	
The	supplier	to	the	system	provider	also	faces	uncertainty	in	the	supply	network,	whereby	similar	to	
the	system	provider	the	number	of	units	to	be	received	can	be	highly	variable	and	a	lack	of	
information	flow	(e.g.	environmental	conditions)	from	the	operator	down	to	the	supplier	can	create	
further	challenges	with	handling	NFF.	Furthermore,	in	the	process	of	responding	to	the	system	
operator	regarding	the	provided	unit	various	options	are	present	with	sending	the	unit	back	to	the	
system	provider,	doing	extra	tests	and	sending	a	new	unit	to	the	system	provider.	Each	of	these	
options	will	be	influenced	by	business	pressures	and	the	environmental	information	available,	which	
are	also	uncertain	variables.		
	
Overall,	uncertainty	of	NFF	is	a	major	factor	that	needs	to	be	considered	when	considering	the	life	
cycle	of	equipment.	In	this	process,	uncertainties	need	to	be	adequately	considered	in	order	to	
evaluate	the	potential	impact	on	cost,	equipment	performance	and	safety.	Furthermore,	the	ability	
to	evaluate	the	dynamic	behaviour	of	equipment	health	at	the	early	stages	of	the	life	cycle	is	
becoming	increasingly	essential	due	to	commercial	interests	to	evaluate	provider	profitability	and	
customer	affordability	and	supplier	sustainability.		
	
In	addition	to	the	theoretical	developments,	the	graphical	representation	of	the	NFF	process	is	
illustrated	as	a	conceptual	model	by	the	use	of	a	Petri	nets.	This	is	based	on	the	captured	knowledge	
regarding	NFF	decision	making	in	the	participating	organisations.	It	reveals	the	dynamic	behaviour	of	
the	problem;	however,	its	mathematical	interpretation	is	still	work	under	progress.	Since	NFF	
decision	making	is	influenced	by	several	factors,	a	Petri	nets	is	a	powerful	tool	that	can	help	
understand	the	complex	situations	that	manifest	NFF	issues.		
7	Conclusions	
No	Fault	Found	(NFF)	is	a	major	problem	for	organizations	that	rely	on	the	functionality	of	assets	or	
systems.	Downtime	as	a	result	of	failure	or	 in	the	case	of	NFF	uncertainty	over	the	function	of	the	
asset	is	a	costly	problem.	There	are	a	number	of	drivers	that	impact	on	NFF	within	an	organization,	
from	 the	 technical	 aspects,	 to	 the	 asset	 and	 human	 factors	 often	 in	 relation	 to	 maintenance	
procedures	 but	 also	 decision	 making	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 entire	 organization.	 Being	 able	 to	
quantitatively	understand	the	effect	 that	decision-making	has	on	NFF	within	an	organization	could	
have	profound	impacts	on	reducing	the	costs	associated	with	NFF.	
The	paper	focused	on	the	aerospace	perspective	of	the	NFF	decision	making	process;	providing	in	
depth	discussions	of	decision-making	through	interviews	and	questionnaires	undertaken	across	
three	large	organizations.	This	work	confirms	existing	attitudes	towards	the	phenomena	and	
investigates	what	influences	its	decision	making.	The	research	shows	that,	contrary	to	loosening	the	
organisational	structure	and	allowing	freedom	in	decision	making	(by	the	individuals	most	suitable	
to	manage	them),	resolution	of	NFF	events	requires	more	control	and	escalation	channels	under	
high	pressure	situations.	So	far,	there	exist	ad-hoc	approaches	that	are	neither	documented	nor	
shared	for	knowledge	distribution.	The	interviews	carried	out	also	reveal	that	effective	NFF	
management	is	not	always	carried	out	based	on	sound	reasoning.	Instead,	it	has	been	a	result	of	the	
perceived	lack	of	alternatives,	lack	of	management	attention	and	even	the	lack	of	trust	in	the	
management’s	ability	to	provide	the	appropriate	support.		
After	acknowledging	the	industrial	attitudes,	the	authors	attempted	to	divide	the	NFF	problem	into	
five	key	processes	that	must	be	controlled	to	mitigate	such	issues.	These	processes	reflect	certain	
characteristics	of	NFF	events:	i.e.	(i)	investigating	intermittent	failures,	(ii)	the	reluctance	to	simply	
procedures	and	designs;	which	can	reduce	complexities	that	lead	to	NFF	events,	(iii)	how	
investigation	are	carried	out,	(iv)	not	adding	any	resilience	to	processes,	and	(v)	the	tendency	to	shift	
the	decision	making	process.	The	motivation	for	this	classification	is	to	improve	understanding	of	the	
root	cause	and	context	of	NFF	events.	
	
	
Future	work:	Now	that	the	authors	have	successfully	outlined	the	drivers	affecting	the	NFF	decision	
making	process	and	its	initial	model,	there	is	a	plethora	of	research	work	that	can	be	carried	out.	The	
immediate	steps	are	to:	
• Investigate	the	impact	of	the	developed	NFF	policies	within	the	three	participating	
organisations.	
• Drive	the	mathematical	formation	from	the	Petri	net	model.	The	developed	meta-models	
can	now	be	work	towards	a	unified	framework	to	NFF	issue	formulation.		Such	a	modelling	
approach	can	be	used	by	organizations	(within	the	whole	supply	chain)	for	operational	and	
strategic	management	decision-making	to	investigate	different	scenarios	and	alternatives	
incorporating	various	constraints	and	priorities.	
• Use	a	sensitivity	analysis	to	identify	the	high	impact	or	dominant	areas	for	NFF	decision	
making	within	the	management	hierarchy.	A	Petri	Net-based	approach	can	enable	decision	
making	with	added	knowledge	and	capability	for	addressing	semi	structured	and	ill-
structured	NFF	events.	
• Finally,	the	research	aims	to	incorporate	this	knowledge	in	benchmarking	tools	to	serve	as	
key	performance	indicators	for	NFF	problems.	
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